APPENDIX A — ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, FILED OCTOBER 12, 2010

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

ORDER

A combined petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc having been filed by the Appellees, and the petition for rehearing, having been referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc having been referred to the circuit judges who are in regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing be, and the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

The mandate of the court will issue on October 19, 2010.

Appendix A

FOR THE COURT

/s/
Jan Horbaly
Clerk

Dated: 10/12/2010

cc: Aldo Noto
Mark Lee Hogge

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
OCT 12 2010
JAN HORBALY
CLERK

WYERS V MASTER LOCK, 2009-1412
(DCT - 1:06-CV-00619)

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECIDED JULY 22, 2010

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PHILIP W. WYERS
AND WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

2009-1412

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in case no. 1:06-CV-00619, Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock.

Decided: July 22, 2010

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MARK LEE HOGGE, Greenberg Traurig LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With him on the brief were ROBERT PHILLIP CHARROW and LAURA METKOFF KLAUS. Of counsel on the brief was AARON P. BRADFORD, Lathrop & Gage LLP, of Denver, Colorado.

ALDO NOTO, Andrews Kurth, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were FREDERICK S. FREI and LORI EDEN BURGESS.

Before LOURIE, LINN, and DYK, *Circuit Judges*.

Opinion for the court filed by *Circuit Judge* DYK.

Concurring opinion filed by *Circuit Judge* LINN.

DYK, *Circuit Judge*.

Master Lock Company LLC ("Master Lock") appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in favor of Philip W. Wyers and Wyers Products Group, Inc. (collectively, "Wyers"). A jury found that Master Lock failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that claims 15, 19, 21, and 24 of U.S. Patent No. 6,672,115 (the "'115 patent"), claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,165,426 (the "'426 patent"), and claims 1, 9, and 11 of U.S. Patent No. 7,225,649 (the "'649 patent" or the "seal patent"), would have been obvious. The district court denied

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Master Lock's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"). *Wyers v. Master Lock Co.*, No. 06-cv-00619-LTB, 2009 WL 1309774 (D. Colo. May 8, 2009) ("*JMOL Order*"). We reverse, as we find that the claims in the patents-in-suit would have been obvious as a matter of law.

BACKGROUND

The patents at issue in this case cover hitch pin locks that secure trailers to cars and sport utility vehicles. A hitch pin secures a draw bar or tow ball mount to a hitch receiver attached to a motor vehicle. The hitch pin passes through aligned apertures in the trailer hitch receiver and draw bar in order to secure the two members together. The patents describe a barbell-shaped lock with a stop portion on one end, a locking head on the other end, and a shank portion which passes through the aligned apertures of the hitch receiver and the towball mount.

The use of a lock in a trailer hitch receiver was well known in the art prior to the '115 and '426 patents. Like the patented inventions, U.S. Patent No. 5,664,445 (the "Chang patent") discloses a lock with a lock head, a shackle having a stop member, a shank, and a latch. The lock is shown being used as a hitch pin lock. The following figure shows the prior art configuration:

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Chang Patent, Figure 8



FIG. 8

The use of barbell-shaped locks, such as those described in the patents-in-suit, was also well known in the prior art. U.S. Patent No. 4,711,106 (the "Johnson patent") discloses a hitch pin lock. *See* Johnson patent col.1 ll.6-11; *see also* U.S. Patent No. 5,284,038 patent col.1. ll.6-10. The Johnson patent shows a barbell-shaped lock being used as a trailer hitch receiver lock:

Johnson Patent, Figure 1



Wyers' own patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,055,832 (the "'832 patent"), discloses a barbell-shaped locking device comprising a locking head, a shackle having a stop member, a shank, and a latch. *See* '832 patent col.5 ll.37-57. The '832 patent also shows a barbell-shaped lock being used as a hitch pin lock in a manner very similar to Figure 1 of the Johnson patent. *See id.* figs. 1-2.

The patents-in-suit claim improvements to the prior art locks. The '115 patent and '426 patent[1] (collectively, "the sleeve patents") claim a hitch pin lock having a removable sleeve to increase the shank's diameter, and a method for providing a hitch pin lock with a removable sleeve on the shank.[2] Figure 5 of the '115 patent depicts the claimed invention.

1. The '426 patent was filed as a divisional of the '115 patent application.

2. Some of the asserted claims are more broadly directed to a "locking device" rather than a locking hitch pin device, *see, e.g.*, '115 patent col.2 ll.56-57, and the specification indicates that "the present invention may also be used as a coupler lock, as a watercraft lock, cross bolt gate lock, spare tire lock, bike carrier lock, a cable lock and any other similar locking structure." *Id.* col.4 ll.41-45.

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'115 Patent, Figure 5



The claimed sleeve slides over the shank of the hitch pin lock, increasing the diameter of the shank and enabling use with trailer hitch receivers of different apertures, *see* '115 patent Abstract, particularly the 1/2 inch and 5/8 inch apertures that are the industry standard for certain towing applications. The '115 patent touts the invention's primary benefit, namely its size adaptability. *Id.* col.1 ll.15-18, col.2 ll.20-36, 45-47. The removeable sleeve is not claimed to improve the locking or towing functions, but is claimed to be desirable because it allows for "a single locking unit [to] be used for a number of varied size locking requirements," *id.* col.2 ll.32-34, thus saving retailers shelf space. Claim 15 of the '115 patent is representative:

> 15. A locking hitch pin device for interconnecting a hitch bar with a hitch receiver, said bar and receiver each including apertures disposed therein for receiving the hitch pin device, said device comprising:

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(a) a hitch pin shank having first and second end portions and a thickness dimension;

(b) a latch portion disposed at said first end portion;

(c) a locking head member moveable between locked and unlocked states and configured for selective engagement with said latch portion;

(d) a stop member disposed at said second end portion;

(e) a sleeve for selective engagement with said hitch pin shank to selectively vary the thickness dimension thereof to match the size diameter of the hitch bar and the receiver apertures to permit snug engagement therewith; and

(f) a retaining apparatus operative to resist removal of said sleeve from said hitch pin shank when said locking head member is in the unlocked state and removed from said latch portion.

'115 patent col.10 ll.21-41. The '426 patent claims a "method for varying the diameter of the linear shank

[of a locking device] to adapt the locking device to variable sized apertures in components to be locked with said device." '426 patent col.11 ll.17-20. The specifications for the '115 patent and '426 patent are very similar.

The '649 patent claims an improved locking device with an external seal designed to insulate the locking mechanism of the lock from the ingress of contaminants. '649 patent col.7 ll.13-15. Claim 1 of the '649 patent is representative:

> 1. A locking device, comprising:
>
> (A) a shackle member including (1) an elongated shank portion having a longitudinally extending axis,
>
> (2) a stop portion at a first end of said shank portion, and
>
> (3) a latch portion at a second end of said shank portion, said shank portion having an outer surface margin adjacent to said latch portion;
>
> (B) a locking head including a casing having a surrounding sidewall surface and a generally flat transverse inner head face with an entryway sized and adapted to mate with said latch portion in a

longitudinal axial direction and a locking mechanism disposed in said casing, said locking mechanism being moveable between

(1) a locked state to lockably retain said latch portion in said locking head when said latch portion is in an engaged state and

(2) an unlocked state to release said latch portion therefrom; and

(C) a head cover including

(1) a cover portion operative to engage the sidewall surface of said casing in surrounding relation thereto and extending therealong in the longitudinal axial direction so as to be secured thereto, and

(2) a flexible, resilient flange portion extending inwardly from said cover portion to define an opening having a surrounding flange edge that defines a seal structure, the opening being sized such that said latch portion may be inserted into and removed from said locking head through the opening with said seal structure operative when said latch

> portion is in the engaged state to sealably engage the outer surface margin of said shank portion.

Id. col.8 ll.13-47. The head cover, which encases the locking head, is preferably made of a "stiff yet resilient material," and the seal structure is formed by the flange portion that extends inwardly from the cover. *Id.* col.3 ll.48-50; *id.* col.7 ll.7-15.

A major manufacturer, Master Lock, offered for sale locks that allegedly fell within the claims of the '115, '426, and '649 patents. In April of 2006, Wyers filed this lawsuit, ultimately asserting infringement of claims 15, 19, 21, and 24 of the '115 patent, claim 1 of the '426 patent, and claims 1, 9, and 11 of the '649 patent.[3] The case was tried to a jury over nine days in March of 2009. At the close of evidence, the district court granted Wyers' motions for JMOL on infringement. Master Lock contended, however, that all of the patents-in-suit would have been obvious over the prior art. At trial, Wyers admitted that both the Chang and Johnson references disclosed every limitation of the '115 and '426 patent claims except the use of the sleeve to adjust the operative thickness of the shank. Moreover, it was undisputed that Wyers' own Trimax T2 and T3 barbell-shaped locks on sale prior to the '115 patent priority

3. Wyers also asserted infringement of claims 17 and 18 of the '832 patent. In May of 2008, the district court granted Master Lock's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to the '832 patent. The claims of the '832 patent are not involved in this appeal.

date also satisfied every limitation of the asserted claims of the '115 and '426 patents but those for the sleeve. Master Lock asserted that the sleeve claims would have been obvious over the combination of the prior art locking devices, *inter alia*, in combination with U.S. Patent No. 3,963,264 (the "Down patent"), or in combination with Master Lock's 37D padlock. Thus, as the district court described, the relevant question for the jury's consideration with respect to the asserted sleeve patent claims was "whether Master Lock presented clear and convincing evidence that the use of a sleeve to adjust the operative thickness of a shank would have been obvious." *See JMOL Order*, 2009 WL 1309774, at *3.

Similarly, the external seal is concededly the only feature of the '649 seal patent that distinguishes it from the Chang patent and the '832 patent.[4] Master Lock argued that the patented device would have been obvious over the combination of the prior art locking devices with any of the following: the Master Lock 6121 padlock, U.S. Patent No. 5,156,029 (the "Heald patent"), U.S. Patent No. 3,858,419 (the "Hampton patent"), and U.S. Patent No. 3,848,440 (the "Manuel patent"). Thus, as the district court noted, the sole question for the jury's consideration with respect to the seal patent was "whether Master Lock presented clear and convincing

4. The '832 patent is Wyers' own patent, and thus is not prior art against the '649 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). However, it is prior art against the '649 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), as the '832 patent issued more than one year prior to the filing date of the '649 patent.

evidence that the use of an external flat flange seal would have been obvious." *See JMOL Order*, 2009 WL 1309774, at *5.

The question of obviousness on the disputed claims of the '115 patent, the '426 patent, and the '649 patent was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict finding that the asserted claims were not obvious, and awarded Wyers $5.35 million in damages as a reasonable royalty. The district court granted Wyers' motion for a continuing injunction against Master Lock for future infringement, and entered judgment in favor of Wyers in the form of a 24% royalty for any infringing products Master Lock has sold or does sell prior to the effective date of the injunction, plus $1,137,920 in pre-judgment interest. *See Wyers v. Master Lock Co.*, No. 06-cv-00619-LTB-MJW, dkt. No. 325 (D. Col. May 28, 2009) (Judgment). After trial, Master Lock renewed its JMOL motion on obviousness. The district court denied the motion, and upheld the jury verdict. *JMOL Order*, 2009 WL 1309774, at *3. Master Lock timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

A patent is invalid for obviousness "if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying

findings of fact. *In re Kubin*, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The underlying factual inquiries include: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) any relevant secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of others. *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Here the scope of the claims of the patents in suit are not at issue and the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art is not contested. The primary factual issues alleged to be in dispute are (1) whether the prior art references are in the same field of endeavor as the patented invention; (2) whether there was sufficient motivation to combine the references; and (3) the existence and significance of pertinent secondary considerations. We address each in turn.

I Relevant Prior Art

Two criteria are relevant in determining whether prior art is analogous: "(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved." *Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.*, 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting *In re Clay*, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Whether a reference in the prior art is "analogous" is a fact question. *In re Clay*, 966 F.2d at 658.

With respect to the sleeve patents, the district court concluded that the jury could implicitly find that the Down patent was outside the scope of the relevant art. *See JMOL Order*, 2009 WL 1309774, at *3. However, the Down patent is specifically directed to a trailer-towing application, adaptable to "a motor vehicle such as an automobile for towing by fitting a rear towing attachment for releasably attaching the tow-bar of a trailer such as a boat trailer, horse box, caravan or other vehicle." Down patent col.1 ll.9-12. Thus, the Down patent is clearly within the same field of endeavor as the sleeve patents.

With respect to the seal patent, the district court concluded that the jury could implicitly find that padlock seals were not relevant prior art. *JMOL Order*, 2009 WL 1309774, at *5. The district court instructed the jury without objection that obviousness must be determined "based on the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the field of locksmithing." J.A. 3332. Given that this jury instruction appears to define the field of endeavor as "locksmithing," there is no reason why padlocks should be excluded from the relevant prior art. Tellingly, the '649 patent itself refers to "the prior art padlock" in the background of the invention. '649 patent col.1 ll.24. Moreover, the '649 patent itself defines its scope broadly, and makes clear that the claims are directed to "locking device[s]" generally. *See id.* col.1 ll.9, col.4 ll.65-66.

Even if the prior art padlocks were not within the same field of endeavor, they are nonetheless clearly "reasonably pertinent" to the problem that the inventor

was trying to solve. *See In re Clay*, 966 F.2d at 659. The Supreme Court's decision in *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398 (2007), directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that "*familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes*, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle." *Id.* at 402 (emphasis added). Here, the prior art padlocks were clearly directed toward the same problem the inventor was trying to solve in the '649 patent, namely, preventing the ingress of contaminants into the locking mechanism. Thus, as a matter of law, the prior art Down patent and the padlock seals were pertinent prior art in the '649 patent, and the district court erred in finding that they were not. We need not determine whether the Master Lock 37D was pertinent prior art.

II Motivation to Combine

The second question for our consideration is whether there was motivation to combine the sleeve with the prior art barbell locks, and similarly, whether there was motivation to combine the prior art locks with an external sealing mechanism. Before the Supreme Court's decision in *KSR*, we required that a patent challenger show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to combine the prior art references and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. *See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.*, 491 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007); *Noelle v. Lederman*, 355 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir.

2004). We had also held that "[t]he reason, suggestion, or motivation to combine may be found explicitly or implicitly: 1) in the prior art references themselves; 2) in the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art that certain references, or disclosures in those references, are of special interest or importance in the field; or 3) from the nature of the problem to be solved." *Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.*, 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *see In re Dembiczak*, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). *KSR*, however, instructs courts to take a more "expansive and flexible approach" in determining whether a patented invention was obvious at the time it was made. 550 U.S. at 415. In particular, the Court emphasized the role of "common sense": "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it." *Id.* at 421.

Before *KSR*, we had also consistently treated the question of motivation to combine prior art references as a question of fact. *See, e.g.*, *Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.*, 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006); *In re Gartside*, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). While *KSR* did not change this rule, *KSR* and our later cases establish that the question of motivation to combine may nonetheless be addressed on summary judgment or JMOL in appropriate circumstances. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 427; *Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.*, 587 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009); *Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc.*, 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009); *Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.*, 532 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2008); *Sundance,*

Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating, Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

KSR featured fairly straightforward technology—an adjustable throttle pedal for an automobile, U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 ("the Engelgau patent"). The patented technology combined an adjustable pedal with an electronic sensor to measure the pedal depression. Both features were present in the prior art, namely U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782 ("Asano") disclosing an adjustable pedal and U.S. Patent 5,819,593 ("Rixon") disclosing an electronic sensor for detecting the pedal's position. When Teleflex, Inc. ("Teleflex") sued KSR International Company ("KSR") for infringement, the district court invalidated the Engelgau patent on summary judgment on the grounds of obviousness. *Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co.*, 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 595 (E.D. Mich. 2003). This court reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the prior art references. *Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co.*, 119 F. App'x 282, 290 (Fed Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court reversed again, concluding that summary judgment was appropriate. This was so because one skilled in the art starting with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed pivot point, and one skilled in the art starting with Rixon would have found it obvious to avoid the problem of wire-chafing by combining Rixon with the adjustable pedal of Asano. *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 423-24.

The Court also made clear that expert testimony concerning motivation to combine may be unnecessary and, even if present, will not necessarily create a genuine issue of material fact. *See id.* at 427. We had held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, as the affidavits of Teleflex's two experts stating their opinion that the invention was non-obvious created a material issue of fact. We had noted that "[a]t the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, it is improper for a district court to make credibility determinations." *Teleflex*, 119 F. App'x. at 290. The Supreme Court disagreed:

> In considering summary judgment on that question the district court can and should take into account expert testimony, which may resolve or keep open certain questions of fact. That is not the end of the issue, however. The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination. . . . *Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary judgment is appropriate.* Nothing in the declarations proffered by Teleflex prevented the District Court from reaching the careful conclusions underlying its order for summary judgment in this case.

KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added).

KSR and our later cases establish that the legal determination of obviousness may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense, in lieu of expert testimony. *See, e.g.*, *Perfect Web*, 587 F.3d at 1329; *Ball Aerosal*, 555 F.3d at 993. In *Perfect Web*, the patented technology involved a method of managing bulk e-mail comprising essentially the steps of targeting a group of recipients, sending e-mail to those recipients, calculating the number of successfully delivered e-mails, and repeating the first three steps until reaching the desired quantity. It was undisputed that the first three steps were disclosed in the prior art. With respect to the last step, the district court explained: "If 100 email deliveries were ordered, and the first transmission delivered only 95, common sense dictates that one should try again. One could do little else." *Perfect Web*, 587 F.3d at 1330. We affirmed the district court's obviousness determination and endorsed its "common sense" reasoning. *Id.* We furthermore concluded that no expert opinion was required to support the obviousness determination, because the technology was "easily understandable." *Id.* at 1329-30 (quoting *Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc.*, 390 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); *see also Sundance*, 550 F.3d at 1365.[5]

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5. However, as we noted in *Centricut*, "expert testimony regarding matters beyond the comprehension of laypersons is sometimes essential," particularly in cases involving complex technology. 390 F.3d at 1369-70 (requiring expert testimony to establish infringement); *Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.*, 536 F.3d 1256, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that expert testimony was required to establish invalidity on grounds of anticipation and obviousness where the subject

(Cont'd)

Thus, in appropriate cases, the ultimate inference as to the existence of a motivation to combine references may boil down to a question of "common sense," appropriate for resolution on summary judgment or JMOL. *See Perfect Web*, 587 F.3d at 1330. Other recent cases have confirmed the appropriateness of this approach. In *Ball Aerosol*, the sole disagreement between the parties and the basis for the district court's denial of the accused infringer's motion for summary judgment of obviousness was whether a motivation to combine the prior art references existed. 555 F.3d at 991. We held that where all of the limitations of the patent were present in the prior art references, and the invention was addressed to a "known problem," "*KSR* . . . compels the grant of summary judgment of obviousness." *Id.* at 993. Similarly, in *Sundance*, we reversed a denial of JMOL on the issue of obviousness, noting that the factual inquiries underlying the determination of obviousness were not in material dispute, and concluding that the patent, which combined two prior art references, was obvious as a matter of law. 550 F.3d at 1365.

(Cont'd)
matter is sufficiently complex to fall beyond the grasp of an ordinary layperson). In such cases, expert testimony may be critical, for example, to establish the existence of certain features in the prior art, *see Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC*, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2004), or the existence (or lack thereof) of a motivation to combine references, *see Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.*, 464 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

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With these principles in mind, we consider whether the evidence established the existence of a motivation to combine references as to the sleeve patents. The above-referenced Down patent discloses a trailer towing attachment, adaptable to "a motor vehicle such as an automobile for towing by fitting a rear towing attachment for releasably attaching the tow-bar of a trailer such as a boat trailer, horse box, caravan or other vehicle." Down patent col.1 ll.9-12.

Down Patent, Figure 1



The invention is embodied by a

> support plate . . . with two parallel flat lugs [2,3] which, when the plate is mounted on a

> towing vehicle, project rearwardly from the plate and are spaced apart one above the other in respective horizontal planes, the upper lug being provided on its upper surface with an upstanding spherical boss [5] upon which a socket of a tow-bar can be seated, a bore extending through the centre of the boss and through the two lugs, and a pin engageable in the bore [11].

Id. col.1 ll.45-54. The towing attachment accepts either a tow-bar eye or tow-ball arrangement. In the tow-bar eye arrangement, the pin passes between the two lugs and through the towing eye and then is "locked in position." *Id.* col.1 l.20. The patent describes that "[a] locking element [9] may be provided for engagement in a transverse hole in the lower end of the pin . . . . The locking element may be of any convenient known type, preferably with a spring retaining means." *Id.* col.2 ll.3-8. The patent also discloses a "steel sleeve" as an "optional feature [that] fits over the portion of the pin which spans the space between the two lugs." *Id.* col.3 ll.15-17. The external diameter of the sleeve is such that the towing eye can be secured between the lugs with the sleeve interposed between the pin and the eye.

The existence of different aperture sizes in standard hitch receivers was a known problem: as the sleeve patent acknowledge, industry standards require hitch receivers to use pins of different sizes for different applications, thus resulting in inconvenience and added expense. *See* '115 patent col.2 ll.28-32 ("[A] number of

different locking devices having different sized shanks are needed to meet varied particular applications. This is cumbersome and expensive. Therefore, there is a need for a locking mechanism using a linear shank that is convertible for various applications."); '426 patent col.2 ll.37-41. Moreover, as Philip Wyers himself acknowledged, it was also a known problem that among mass retailers such as Wal-Mart, space is at a premium. J.A. 4295. The Down patent clearly teaches that sleeves of different external diameter "may be provided for the attachment of trailer towing eyes of different internal diameter." Down patent col.3 ll.20-23. When the sleeve is used, the pin accommodates larger diameter towing eyes; without the sleeve, the pin fits smaller ones. It is simply a matter of common sense that the sleeve used in Down, in a towing attachment quite similar to a hitch receiver/tow bar arrangement, could be combined with a barbell-shaped hitch pin lock in order to address the known problem of different aperture sizes in standard hitch receivers and the shelf-space problem experienced by retailers. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 421 ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense."); *Ball Aerosol*, 555 F.3d at 993. Likewise, it is clear that a skilled artisan would have perceived a reasonable expectation of success as a result of combining these two elements of the prior art references. *See In re O'Farrell*, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed.

Cir. 1988) ("For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.").

None of Wyers' arguments to the contrary is convincing. First, Wyers argues that Master Lock did not consider Down to be invalidating prior art in its own patent application for its convertible sleeve. Wyers filed the '115 patent application in April of 2000. Master Lock independently filed a patent application in February of 2001 that issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,862,905 (the "'905 patent"), claiming a pin lock with a cylindrical locking mechanism that includes a locking disc; the patent also claimed a "sleeve dimensioned to slide over . . . a portion of said first locking member." '905 patent col.6 ll.49-50. However, Master Lock's '905 patent application, while claiming a convertible sleeve, *see id.* col.6 ll.50-52, did not claim that the sleeve represented a novel aspect of the invention. Moreover, Master Lock's patent application should be treated no differently than a patent application by a third party. Obviousness protects the public at large, not a particular infringer, and one is not estopped from asserting the invalidity of a patent by the fact that one has previously made an attempt to procure a patent for substantially the same invention. As the Supreme Court concluded in *Haughey v. Lee*, 151 U.S. 282, 332-33 (1894), "the defense of want of patentable invention in a patent operates, not merely to exonerate the defendant, but to relieve the public from an asserted monopoly, and the court cannot be prevented from so declaring by the fact that the defendant had ineffectually sought to secure the monopoly for himself." *See also Paramount Publix Corp.*

v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464, 477 (1935) ("However inconsistent this early attempt to procure a patent may be with petitioner's present contention of its invalidity for want of invention, this Court has long recognized that such inconsistency affords no basis for an estoppel, nor precludes the court from relieving the alleged infringer and the public from the asserted monopoly when there is no invention."). The Master Lock application thus does not defeat an assertion of obviousness. The failure of Master Lock employees to cite the Down patent as prior art in internal idea disclosure forms when Master Lock was considering filing its own patent application similarly does not defeat an argument of obviousness. What Master Lock employees subjectively knew or believed at the time they were considering filing the '905 patent application is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is what a hypothetical ordinarily skilled artisan would have gleaned from the prior art references at the time that the patent applications leading to the sleeve patents were filed. *See, e.g.*, *Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1343, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Second, Wyers argues that Down could not be considered because Master Lock introduced no expert testimony directed to Down. However, as we noted above, expert testimony is not required when the references and the invention are easily understandable. *Perfect Web*, 587 F.3d at 1329.

Third, Wyers argues that there are differences between the sleeve arrangement disclosed in the Down

patent and the sleeve arrangement in the patents-in-suit. In the Down patent, the hitch arrangement is vertical, *see* Down patent, fig.1, whereas in the patents-in-suit it is horizontal, *see* '115 patent, fig.1; '426 patent, fig.1. Moreover, in Down, the sleeve covers only the middle portion of the pin, whereas in the patents-in-suit, the sleeve covers the entire shank. Wyers also asserts that the pin in the Down patent is not designed to fit tightly through a metal eye, while in the '115 and '426 sleeve patents, it fits snugly. However, we do not find these slight distinctions to be material.

Finally, Wyers suggests that an ordinary skilled artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation of success with the patented invention, because of the expectation that a sleeve would weaken the strength of the pin against "shear forces" due to a welding seam in the sleeve. J.A. 4078. Shear forces are the scissoring actions that are exerted by the load during towing due to stopping and starting, bumps in the road, or other sudden impacts. The claims do arguably require that the hitch pin be load-bearing; the very purpose of a "locking hitch pin device for interconnecting a bar with a hitch receiver" necessarily implies a limitation that the hitch pin be capable of bearing a load. *See* '115 patent col.10 ll.21-22. However, the claims do not require any particular resistance to shear forces or any particular towing strength associated with the towing pin or sleeve; the sole benefit of the sleeve described in the patent is its size adaptability. *See id.* col.2 ll.20-36; *id.* col.5 ll.52-57. Moreover, one skilled in the art would have known from the Down patent that a size-adapting sleeve could

work on a load-bearing towing pin. Wyers himself conceded that Down discloses a load-bearing pin with a sleeve. *See* Appellee's Br. 25 ("[T]he bushing and pin appear to be load-bearing . . . ."); J.A. 4328 ("Q. But it would be a load-bearing surface, wouldn't it? A. Sure."). Thus, one skilled in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the sleeve with the barbell lock to solve the problem of size adaptability, in light of the prior art teachings. *See Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd.*, 580 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

We conclude that it was a matter of common sense to combine the Down patent with the prior art barbell locks in order to arrive at the invention claimed in the '115 and '426 patents, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.

We next address the question of whether there was motivation to combine the prior art barbell locks with an external sealing mechanism. Some of the prior art hitch pin locks, such as the '832 patent and the Chang patent, used internal sealing mechanisms. The Chang patent claims an internal seal consisting of a sealing ring placed in a groove on the shank of the lock. Chang patent col.4 ll.54-57. Wyers' '832 patent claims an "o-ring" seal located on a groove on the latch that serves to prevent the ingress of unwanted substances into the locking head, essentially moving the sealing ring of Chang from an internal to an external position. *See* '832 patent col.7 ll.52-57. Additionally, at trial Master Lock also

introduced a number of padlocks having a variety of external seal configurations. The Master Lock 6121 series padlock includes an external seal at the entry point of the shackle into the lock head. *See* J.A. 762. The Heald patent similarly discloses an external flange seal that grips the circumference of the shackle arms to form "a weatherproof seal." Heald patent col.3 ll.62-col.4 l.3.

Master Lock 6121

Figures 8 and 9 of the Heald Patent



The Hampton patent discloses a padlock with an external seal covering the locking head. The flat cover lid in the Hampton patent incorporates holes with shackle receiving edges through which the padlock

shackle passes to provide a seal around the shackle. Hampton patent col.4 ll.3-7. The seal is intended, in part, to protect the locking mechanism from the elements and the ingress of such contaminants as "dirt and ice." *Id.* col.1 ll.18-29. The Manuel patent also discloses a padlock with a flat external seal covering the locking head, in which the holes are beveled and adapted to receive the shackle legs. Manuel patent col.1 ll.33-35.

Hampton Patent, Figure 1 *Manuel Patent, Figure 2*





Thus, at the time of the invention, there were two known ways to protect a lock's locking head from the ingress of contaminants—an external or an internal seal—and both design options were common and widely used in locks in the prior art. It is a matter of common sense that a flat external seal used in the prior art padlocks could be combined with a barbell-shaped hitch pin lock. Indeed, the district court described the difference between the invention of the '649 patent and the prior art as "slight indeed." *Wyers v. Master Lock Co.*, No. 06-cv-00619, 2008 WL 2168977, at *12 (D. Colo. May 22, 2008). Wyers himself admitted that an external flange

seal would work the same way on a padlock as it does on a barbell-shaped lock, and that the purpose of the seals was the same in the prior art padlocks as in the patented device. We conclude that the invention of the '649 patent represents no more than "the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions," *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417, and as such, the claims of the '649 patent are obvious as a matter of law.

Wyers argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in using an external flange seal on a barbell lock, because a "turtleneck" seal such as the one appearing in the Master Lock 6121 would "limit the shackle usage as it encroaches up the shackle," and would subject the seal to "deformation, possible damage." J.A. 4192. However, even if this is in fact the case, flat external seals that do not extend up the shank of the shackle also existed in the prior art. Both the Manual patent and the Hampton patent disclose a flat, external flange seal covering the locking head. *See* Manuel patent col.1 ll.33-35; Hampton patent, col.4 ll.3-7.

Wyers again argues that Master Lock's own patent application on a similar external seal filed in July of 2003 "admitted" that the external seal was "novel, nonobvious and useful and therefore warranted patent protection." Appellee's Br. 31. Master Lock filed a patent application in July of 2003 for a barbell-shaped coupler lock which included an external seal in the form of a protective covering with an opening that resulted in an "interference fit between the seal and the shaft." J.A.

11465.[6] Furthermore, Wyers argues, Master Lock's patent application fails to list any of the prior art that Master Lock now claims is invalidating. Appellee's Br. 32. However, the fact that Master Lock claimed that its external seal was novel bears no evidentiary significance; Master Lock's patent application should be treated no differently than a patent application by a third party, as discussed above.

Thus, we conclude that it was a matter of common sense to combine the prior art barbell locks with an external sealing mechanism in order to arrive at the claimed invention of the '649 patent, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.

III Secondary Considerations

At trial, Wyers presented evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness, including commercial success, copying, and unexpected results. Wyers argued that commercial success was established by Master Lock's success in marketing and selling its infringing product, the invention's success among retailers such as WalMart who sought to save shelf-space, and Master Lock's failure to find a non-infringing substitute. Wyers also argues that competitors' copying and marketing of convertible shank hitch pin locks shortly after the

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6. This patent application never issued, apparently because Master Lock's application was denied in light of Wyers' earlier application for the '649 patent.

invention's existence became known supports a finding of nonobviousness.

We reject Wyers' contention that secondary considerations of obviousness are sufficient to support the jury verdict of nonobviousness. Our case law clearly establishes that the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. *See In re Huang*, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the proponent must offer proof "that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the *claimed invention*") (emphasis added); *In re GPAC Inc.*, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("For objective [evidence of secondary considerations] to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the *claimed invention*.") (emphasis added). Here, Wyers essentially concedes that he is unable to prove a nexus to the seal patent, and provides no independent evidence for the commercial success of the seal patent. Even with respect to the sleeve patents, Wyers relies solely on Master Lock's $20 million in sales of the accused product, and established no direct nexus to the sleeve feature.

Additionally, Wyers failed to establish copying. Not every competing product that arguably falls within the scope of a patent is evidence of copying; otherwise, "every infringement suit would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent." *Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.*, 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Our case law holds that copying requires evidence

of efforts to replicate a specific product, which may be demonstrated through internal company documents, direct evidence such as disassembling a patented prototype, photographing its features, and using the photograph as a blueprint to build a replica, or access to the patented product combined with substantial similarity to the patented product. *Iron Grip*, 392 F.3d at 1325; *see Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc.*, 344 F.3d 1186, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003); *Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ.*, 212 F.3d 1272, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Wyers introduced no such evidence here.

Moreover, secondary considerations of nonobviousness—considered here by the district court—simply cannot overcome a strong prima facie case of obviousness. *See Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.*, 544 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008); *Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp.*, 520 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008); *Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.*, 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid); *DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.*, 464 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence *only* supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious."). Here, where the inventions

represented no more than "the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions," *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417, the secondary considerations are inadequate to establish nonobviousness as a matter of law.

Thus, we conclude that the asserted claims of the '115, '426, and '649 patent would have been obvious as a matter of law. We reverse the district court's holding that the asserted claims of the '115, '426, and '649 patents were nonobvious. In light of our disposition, we do not reach issues concerning the calculation of damages.

REVERSED

COSTS

Costs to Appellant.

Appendix B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PHILIP W. WYERS
AND WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

2009-1412

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in case no. 1:06-CV-00619, Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock.

LINN, *Circuit Judge*, concurring.

While I concur both in the conclusion reached and the reasoning expressed in Judge Dyk's opinion for the Court, I write to address concerns raised following the Supreme Court's decision in *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) with respect to general verdicts relating to obviousness.

Appendix B

It is well established that whether an invention would have been obvious at the time the invention was made is a mixed question of law and fact. *See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd.*, 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, which we review de novo. *Id.* This determination is based on the underlying factual determinations set forth in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966), which we review for clear error. *Id.*

In *KSR*, the Supreme Court confirmed that "[t]he ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination." 550 U.S. at 427. This acknowledgement did not change longstanding precedent permitting the submission of obviousness questions to a jury for a general verdict, provided the jury has received proper instruction on the law. As stated by this Court in *Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*:

> [I]t is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the jury. No warrant appears for distinguishing the submission of legal questions to a jury in patent cases from such submissions routinely made in other types of cases. So long as the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial should not be rationed, nor should particular issues in particular types of cases be treated differently from similar issues in other types of cases. Scholarly disputes over use of jury trials in technically complex cases relate to the right

> to trial by jury itself, and center on whether lay juries are capable of making correct fact determinations, not over the propriety of submitting legal questions to juries. The obviousness issue may be in some cases complex and complicated, on both fact and law, but no more so than equally complicated, even technological, issues in product liability, medical injury, antitrust, and similar cases. Indeed, though the analogy like most is not perfect, the role of the jury in determining obviousness is not unlike its role in reaching a legal conclusion respecting negligence, putting itself in the shoes of one "skilled in the art" at the time the invention was made in the former and in the shoes of a "reasonable person" at the time of the events giving rise to the suit in the latter.

722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983); *see also Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai*, 520 U.S. 548, 554 (1997) (stating that where an "inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact . . . it often will be inappropriate to take the question from the jury") (internal citations omitted); *United States v. Gaudin*, 515 U.S. 506, 511-16 (1995) (stating that the determination of whether a statement is "material" is ultimately a legal question, based on several underlying questions of "purely historical fact," which "has typically been resolved by juries" and "[j]uries at the time of the framing could not be forced to produce mere 'factual findings,' but were entitled to deliver a general verdict pronouncing the defendant's

guilt or innocence"); *McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander*, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991) (holding that the mixed law and fact question of who is a "seaman" under the Jones Act is a question for the jury, which "finds the facts and . . . applies the legal standard"); *White v. Jeffrey Mining Mach. Co.*, 723 F.2d 1553, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Jeffrey argues that the judge improperly submitted this question of law to the jury and adopted its conclusion as his own, without the benefit of underlying findings of fact. The argument is without merit. Submission of such a question of law to a jury, accompanied by appropriate instructions, is proper." (citing *Connell*, 722 F.2d at 1542)).

While, "the judge must remain the ultimate arbiter on the question of obviousness," this role is properly exercised on "giving proper instructions on the law to the jury before it considers its verdict" and again "when presented with a motion for JNOV or new trial." *R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co.*, 727 F.2d 1506, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To facilitate review and reveal more clearly the jury's underlying factual findings, this Court has encouraged trial court judges to provide juries with special interrogatories on obviousness. *Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp.*, 520 F.3d 1337, 1343 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008); *Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co.*, 122 F.3d 1476, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp.*, 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984). However, we set forth no hard and fast rule, and "it must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court what form of verdict to request of a jury." *Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co.*, 749 F.2d 707 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Appendix B

Absent any special interrogatories, we must presume the "existence of findings necessary to support the verdict the jury reached." *Perkin-Elmer*, 732 F.2d at 893. Our review of a general verdict on obviousness thus entails two steps. "We first presume that the jury resolved the underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Then we examine the legal conclusion *de novo* to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury fact findings." *Jurgens v. McKasy*, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted); *see also Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp*, 554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009); *Agrizap*, 520 F.3d 1337; *PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.*, 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Because there is no way to determine from a general verdict on obviousness the specific findings of fact made by a jury on the factual questions underlying its verdict, the court in examining the first part of the obviousness question is left to infer whether substantial evidence existed from which the jury could have made the factual findings necessary to support the verdict. Here, the majority examined the record and after considering the factual inferences concluded that support was lacking and that the claims at issue would have been obvious as a matter of law. With both the analysis and the conclusion, I fully agree.

APPENDIX C — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, DATED MAY 28, 2009

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

Civil Case No. 06-cv-00619-LTB-MJW

PHILIP W. WYERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order Approving Stipulation entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on May 22, 2008, Doc No. 168,

IT IS ORDERED that Master Lock's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Non-infringement and Invalidity is granted in part. Summary judgment of non-infringement of the '832 patent is granted.

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order Approving Stipulation entered by the Honorable United

Appendix C

States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on February 27, 2009, upon the Stipulation Regarding Counterclaim for Declaration of Invalidity of '832 Patent, (Doc 261), the following stipulation is approved:

1. Wyers hereby voluntarily withdraws, without prejudice, their verbal motion to dismiss, on the grounds of claim preclusion, Master Lock's counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity of the '832 patent, subject to a right to reassert that motion if the Master Lock ever raises the invalidity issue on the '832 patent in future proceedings.

2. Master Lock hereby voluntarily withdraws, without prejudice, its counterclaim for declaration of invalidity of the '832 patent, subject to a right to reassertthe invalidity issue on the '832 patent if ever the Court's prior finding in this case of non-infringement of the '832 patent is reversed on appeal or is in any other way withdrawn and the claim of infringement of the '832 patent is thereafter reactivated.

3. The parties agree that the Stipulation is without prejudice to any aspect of either side's positions on the question of the validity of the '832 patent and does not constitute an admission or adjudication in any respect concerning either side's arguments on the validity issue.

4. All parties will bear their own fees and costs with respect to the litigation of Master Lock's counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity of the '832 patent.

Appendix C

This matter was tried from March 2, 2009 through March 11, 2009 before a jury of nine duly sworn to try the issues herein, the Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, Judge, presiding.

At the close of the evidence the Court granted Wyers' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Dismissing Master Lock's Claim for Prior Inventorship (Doc No. 278, filed 3/10/09);

Plaintiff Wyers' Rule 50 motion on the question of infringement of the remaining claims in suit, Claims 15, 19, 21 and 24 of the '115 patent and Claim 1 of the '426 patent was granted as confessed;

Plaintiff Wyers' Rule 50 motion on the question of infringement of Claims 1, 9, and 11 of the '649 patent was granted; and

Plaintiff Wyers withdrew the question of infringement of Claim 27 of the '649 patent from the case, thereby resolving all infringement questions on all patents prior to submitting this case to the jury.

The jury returned their **Verdict** as follows:

VERDICT FORM

1. Has Master Lock proven by clear and convincing evidence that the following claims of the '115 patent are obvious as defined in Jury Instructions 6 through 10:

i. The invention of Claim 15 No
ii. The invention of Claim 19 No
iii. The invention of Claim 21 No
iv. The invention of Claim 24 No

2. Has Master Lock proven by clear and convincing evidence that the claims of the '426 patent are obvious as defined in Jury Instructions 6 through 10?

i. The invention of Claim 1 No

3. Has Master Lock proven by clear and convincing evidence that the claims of the '649 patent are obvious as defined in Jury Instructions 6 through 12?

i. The invention of Claim 1 No
ii. The invention of Claim 9 No
iii. The invention of Claim 11 No

FINDINGS ON DAMAGES

What amount is Wyers entitled to as a reasonable royalty?

$5,350,000

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on May 12, 2009, Doc. No. 321,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Master Lock's Motion for Remittitur, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Issue of Damages, is denied.

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on May 12, 2009, Doc. No. 322,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wyers's Motion for Permanent Injunction is granted as follows:

1. IT IS ORDERED that for so long as the relevant patents at issue remain valid, Master Lock is enjoined from the following:

a. The continued manufacture, marketing, sale, or use of the following products with the following base product numbers: 374, 375, 1377, 1471, 1472, 1473, 1474, 1475, 1479, 1480, 1481, 2848, 2866, and 3774. Master Lock may continue to use these product number designations so long as the products sold under these designations comply with the remainder of this Order;

b. The continued manufacture, without a duly executed license from Wyers, of any convertible receiver or coupler locks that embody the claims of the '115 convertible shank patent or the '426 method patent by containing a removable sleeve, or the '649 external seal patent;

c. The continued sale, without a duly executed license from Wyers, of any convertible receiver or coupler locks that embody the claims of the '115 convertible shank patent or the '426 method patent by containing a removable sleeve, or the '649 external seal patent;

d. The continued marketing, without a duly executed license from Wyers, of any convertible receiver or coupler locks that embody the claims of the '115 convertible shank patent or the '426 method patent by containing a removable sleeve, or the '649 external seal patent; and

e. The continued use, without a duly executed license from Wyers, of any convertible receiver or coupler locks that embody the claims of the '115 convertible shank patent or the '426 method patent by containing a removable sleeve, or the '649 external seal patent;

2. Plaintiffs agree that this injunction will permit Master Lock to modify and sell previously manufactured product as follows:

a. Master Lock may sell 1/2 inch receiver locks without the sleeve;

b. Master Lock may sell the 1/2 inch receiver locks with the sleeve permanently welded

to the 1/2 inch shank, thereby creating a solid, nonconvertible 5/8 inch shank;

c. Master Lock may modify and sell its remaining receiver locks with a bumper and an O-ring on the shackle; and

d. Master Lock is enjoined from marketing, selling, or packaging these products as convertible shanks or as locks with an external seal affixed to the locking head;

3. IT IS ORDERED that—to the extent Master Lock has sold or, prior to the effective date of this injunction, does sell any products that it would otherwise be enjoined from selling under the terms of this Order—Master Lock must pay Wyers a 24% royalty consistent with that found to be a reasonable royalty by the jury;

4. Within 30 days of the entry of this Order Master Lock shall provide Wyers:

a. An inventory of all remaining infringing product in Master Lock's possession;

b. A list of all retailers and wholesalers that have purchased infringing product from Master Lock in the previous 12 months;

c. An accounting of all sales of infringing product from January 2009 through the date of this Order; and

d. An ongoing accounting of all sales of infringing product from the date of this Order forward, provided on the 15th of each month following the sale;

5. The terms of this injunction are effective immediately, with the exception that paragraphs 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c shall be effective sixty days following the date of this May 12, 2009 Order providing a royalty is paid in accordance with paragraph 3.

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on May 12, 2009, Doc No. 323,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wyers's Motion for Pre-Judgment Interest is granted. Master Lock is hereby ORDERED to pay Wyers pre-judgment interest in the amount of $1,137,920.

PURSUANT to and in accordance with the Order Regarding Entry of Judgment entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Lewis T. Babcock, on May 21, 2009, and upon the stipulation of the Parties,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2), Judgment is entered for Plaintiffs Philip W. Wyers and Wyers Products Group, Inc., and against the Defendant Master Lock Company as of the date of the Order Regarding Entry of Judgment, May 21, 2009.

Appendix C

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the specific dollar amount of this Judgment is subject to the accounting ordered in Docket Nos. 322 and 323 and the execution of the monetary damages in this matter is stayed for thirty (30) days, or until approval of the *supersedeas* bond under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that post-judgment interest shall accrue at the legal rate of .47 % from the date of the Order Regarding Entry of Judgment, May 21, 2009.

DATED at Denver, Colorado this 28th day of May, 2009.

Approved:
/s/
Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

FOR THE COURT:
GREGORY C. LANGHAM, CLERK

By: /s/
Edward P. Butler, Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX D — ORDER REGARDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, DATED MAY 21, 2009

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-00619-LTB

PHILIP W. WYERS, a Colorado resident,
and WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP, INC.,
a Colorado corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

The Parties have stipulated and the Court does hereby **ORDER** that for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2), the Court hereby enters Judgment in this matter, as of the date of this order, incorporating as that Judgment the following Orders: Order, Docket No. 321, entered May 12, 2009, Order, Docket No. 322, entered May 12, 2009, and Order, Docket 323, entered May 12, 2009. The Court notes that the specific dollar amount of this Judgment is subject to the accounting ordered

in Docket Nos. 322 and 323. As a result, and because the parties are working together to determine the amount and form of a *supersedeas* bond, the Court hereby stays execution of the monetary damages in this matter for thirty (30) days, or until approval of the *supersedeas* bond under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).

Dated May 21, 2009

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
Lewis T. Babcock
Senior Judge

AGREED AND JOINTLY SUBMITTED
this 20th day of May, 2009:

For Plaintiffs **WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP INC.** and **PHILIP WYERS:**

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Appendix D

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Master Lock Company

APPENDIX E — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, DATED MAY 12, 2009

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

Civil Case No. 06-cv-00619-LTB

PHILIP W. WYERS, a Colorado resident,
and, WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP, INC.,
a Colorado corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER

In this patent infringement case, Plaintiffs, Philip W. Wyers and Wyers Products Group, Inc. (collectively "Wyers"), asserted that Defendant, Master Lock Company ("Master Lock"), infringed upon four of Plaintiffs' patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,055,832 (the "'832 patent"); 6,672,115 (the "'115 patent"); 7,165,426 (the "'426 patent"); and 7,225,649 (the "'649 patent"). The '832 patent covers a barbell-shaped lock intended for locking a trailer hitch onto a motor vehicle, with a seal mounted within the locking end of the barbell that prevents the ingress of dirt or other matter into the

locking mechanism. The '115 patent covers a similar lock with a removable sleeve on the shank so as to allow the lock to be used to lock together objects with various sized apertures. The '426 patent covers a method for providing a lock with a removable sleeve on the shank. The '649 patent covers a lock similar to that covered by the '832 patent, but with a sealing cover affixed to the outside of the locking head. Issues relating to infringement and validity of the '832 patent were disposed of before trial.

This matter was tried to a jury over nine days beginning on March 2, 2009. At the close of evidence, the Court granted Wyers's motions for judgment as a matter of law on their infringement claims. The question of obviousness of the remaining disputed claims—claims 15, 19, 21, and 24 of the '115 patent; claim 1 of the '426 patent; and claims 1, 9, and 11 of the '649 patent—was submitted to the jury. The jury found Master Lock failed to show the claims were obvious by clear and convincing evidence and awarded Wyers $5.35 million in damages as a reasonable royalty. The jury's verdict of nonobviousness is now upheld by this Court.

This case is now before me on Master Lock's Motion for Remittitur, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Issue of Damages [**Docket # 292**] and supporting Brief [**Docket # 293**]; Wyers's Response [**Docket # 306**]; and Master Lock's Reply [**Docket # 317**]. Oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this motion. After consideration of the motion, the papers, and the case file, and for the reasons stated

below, I DENY Master Lock's Motion for Remittitur, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Issue of Damages **[Docket # 292]**.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages, a district court in a patent case will apply the law of the regional circuit where the appeal from the district court would normally lie. *See Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH*, 408 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Master Lock bears "the heavy burden of demonstrating the verdict was 'clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.'" *See Blank v. Alexander*, 152 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); *see also Unisplay, S.A. v. American Elec. Sign Co.*, 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("When a party files a motion to amend the judgment or in the alternative to grant a new trial on the amount of damages awarded by a jury, the trial court determines whether the jury's verdict is against the clear or great weight of the evidence."). So long as the jury's damages verdict is within the range of reasonable possible verdicts supported by the evidence, the damages verdict should stand. *See United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc.*, 205 F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000); *Midwest Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter*, 717 F.2d 493, 501–02 (10th Cir. 1983).

II. ANALYSIS

Prior to trial, the question of damages was limited to a "reasonable royalty" as described in 35 U.S.C. § 284 and further defined in *Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.*, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Section 284 "contemplates that when a patentee is unable to prove entitlement to lost profits or an established royalty rate, it is entitled to 'reasonable royalty' damages based upon a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer when the infringement began." *Unisplay*, 69 F.3d at 517. Although the inquiry "necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty," a jury's determination of a reasonable royalty "must be supported by relevant evidence in the record." *Id.*

The jury found $5.35 million to be a reasonable royalty. As both parties acknowledge, this amount appears to have been reached by awarding Wyers approximately half of the profits they would have received had Master Lock sold the offending locks under the private label agreement they formerly had with Wyers. But the $5.35 million royalty calculation was supported by substantial evidence including: Wyers's testimony regarding his prior contentious relationship with Master Lock, his reluctance to license the patents because he felt the protected technology was more valuable for purposes of launching and promoting his own company, his company's ability to meet the market demand for these products and his expected profit margin of 60 to 61 percent if he sold the products

himself, the lack of non-infringing alternatives to the patented technologies, and the competitive advantage Master Lock held in light of its greater size and broader name recognition; documentary evidence showing Master Lock's profits from selling the accused devices were $10.4 million; evidence showing the commercial success and popularity of the accused devices and the high profit margins associated with them; Master Lock's reliance on the sleeve and the external seal in their marketing materials; evidence showing Master Lock chose not to pursue non-infringing alternatives despite its claim that the non-infringing alternatives would have been less expensive to produce; evidence showing the convertible shank benefitted both end users and retailers and the flat flange seal benefitted end users; and evidence showing nearly every hitch pin lock sold by Master Lock infringed at least one of the three patents at issue. Applied to the *Georgia-Pacific* factors and other factors related to the reasonable royalty inquiry—as described in Jury Instruction 14—this substantial evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. *See United Phosphorous*, 205 F.3d at 1228; *Unisplay*, 69 F.3d at 517.

Master Lock argues the jury should have accepted its theory that the royalty be limited to the four percent royalty negotiated between Wyers and Master Lock in regard to the '832 patent—and, according to Master Lock, offered as a similar royalty by Wyers on the '115, '426, and '649 patents. Master Lock argues Mr. Wyers's testimony that he did not offer to license the patents for a four percent royalty and that he did not want to

enter into such an arrangement is "not credible." Such a determination is not for this Court to make, however, as questions of credibility are uniquely the province of the jury. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show the inventions claimed in the '115, '426, and '649 patents were more valuable than the internal seal claimed in the '832 patent. Accordingly, the jury was free to conclude the '832 patent was not "comparable to the '115, '426, and '649 patents" for purposes of calculating a reasonable royalty. *See* Jury Instruction 14.

Master Lock next argues $5.35 million—which represented 24% of Master Lock's proceeds from the sales of the infringing locks—exceeds its profit margin of 15%. At trial, however, Wyers presented evidence showing Master Lock's profits were closer to 60%—a number similar to Wyers's own profits. As shown by the $5.35 million amount, the jury implicitly found the actual profit margin to be higher than the 15% claimed by Master Lock. The jury was not obligated to believe Master Lock's expert any more that it was obligated to believe Mr. Wyers. It would be inappropriate, therefore, to override the jury's verdict based on such a credibility question. The jury could reasonably conclude hypothetical parties in the position of Wyers and Master Lock would negotiate a royalty of 24% in light of an anticipated 60% profit margin. *See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.*, 56 F.3d 1539, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding it was "not unreasonable for the district court to find that an unwilling patentee would only license for one-half of its expected lost profits and that such an amount was a reasonable royalty"). Master Lock further argues that

the jury failed to discount the value of the non-patented features of the accused locks. As noted by Wyers, however, Federal Circuit authority holds that—for purposes of calculating a reasonable royalty—a patentee may recover a royalty based on the value of the entire infringing apparatus so long as the patented feature provides the basis for consumer demand. *See Rite-Hite*, 56 F.3d at 1549. Evidence presented at trial—including Master Lock's marketing materials, product packaging, and sales figures, as well as Mr. Wyers's testimony—showed the sleeve and external seal drove the market demand for the hitch pin locks Master Lock sold. Although Master Lock presented testimony suggesting that customer service, quality, and brand recognition were more important to driving sales than the claimed inventions, the jury was not obligated to find this testimony persuasive over the documentary evidence or Mr. Wyers's testimony.

Finally, Master Lock argues the existence of non-infringing substitutes must cap the reasonable royalty award because no potential licensee in a hypothetical negotiation would agree to pay a royalty in excess of the cost of switching to a non-infringing alternative. By finding the reasonable royalty to be 24%, however, the jury implicitly found Master Lock's proffered solution—which consisted of packaging two pins of varying sizes in one package—not to be a "non-infringing substitute." The existence of non-infringing substitutes is a question of fact, reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. *Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.*, 976 F.2d 1559, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In light of the obvious differences between

the claimed invention and Master Lock's proffered solution—particularly when coupled with Master Lock's decision not to sell the alleged "non-infringing substitute" despite believing selling two shanks in one package would be cheaper than selling a sleeved shank—I find no such error here.

III. CONCLUSION

"A district court is not limited to selecting one or the other of the specific royalty figures urged by counsel as reasonable." *See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp.*, 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Unless the Court is convinced that the jury "clearly erred in the inference it drew from all the evidence," the jury's verdict in regard to reasonable royalty "must be affirmed as reasonable." *See id.* Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, I am not persuaded that the $5.35 million figure "is, in view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high or so outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of reasonable royalty." *See Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.*, 895 F.2d 1403, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, Master Lock's Motion for Remittitur, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Issue of Damages [**Docket # 292**] is DENIED.

Dated: May 12 , 2009.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

APPENDIX F — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, DATED MAY 8, 2009

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO,
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

Civil Case No. 06-cv-00619-LTB

PHILIP W. WYERS, a Colorado resident,
and, WYERS PRODUCTS GROUP, INC.,
a Colorado corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MASTER LOCK COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER

In this patent infringement case, Plaintiffs, Philip W. Wyers and Wyers Products Group, Inc. (collectively "Wyers"), asserted that Defendant, Master Lock Company ("Master Lock"), infringed upon four of Plaintiffs' patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,055,832 (the "'832 patent"); 6,672,115 (the "'115 patent"); 7,165,426 (the "'426 patent"); and 7,225,649 (the "'649 patent"). The

'832 patent covers a barbell-shaped lock intended for locking a trailer hitch onto a motor vehicle, with a seal mounted within the locking end of the barbell that prevents the ingress of dirt or other matter into the locking mechanism. The '115 patent covers a similar lock with a removable sleeve on the shank so as to allow the lock to be used to lock together objects with various sized apertures. The '426 patent covers a method for providing a lock with a removable sleeve on the shank. The '649 patent covers a lock similar to that covered by the '832 patent, but with a sealing cover affixed to the outside of the locking head. Issues relating to infringement and validity of the '832 patent were disposed of before trial.

This matter was tried to a jury over nine days beginning on March 2, 2009. At the close of evidence, the Court granted Wyers's motions for judgment as a matter of law on their infringement claims. The question of obviousness of the remaining disputed claims—claims 15, 19, 21, and 24 of the '115 patent; claim 1 of the '426 patent; and claims 1, 9, and 11 of the '649 patent—was submitted to the jury. The jury found Master Lock failed to show the claims were obvious by clear and convincing evidence and awarded Wyers $5,350,000 in damages as a reasonable royalty.

This case is now before me on Master Lock's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law that Asserted Claims of the Patents in Suit are Invalid [**Docket # 294**] and supporting Brief [**Docket # 295**]; Wyers's Response [**Docket # 308**]; and Master Lock's

Reply [**Docket # 316**] and Amended Reply [**Docket # 318**]. Oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this motion. After consideration of the motion, the papers, and the case file, and for the reasons stated below, I DENY Master Lock's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law that Asserted Claims of the Patents in Suit are Invalid [**Docket # 294**].

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Master Lock argues the claimed inventions of the '115, '426, and '649 patents are invalid because they would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art. "Although it is well settled that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, it is also well understood that there are factual issues underlying the ultimate obviousness decision. Specifically, the obviousness analysis is based on four underlying factual inquiries, the well-known *Graham* factors: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of nonobviousness." *See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001). I am guided by the presumption that a patent is presumed to be valid, and this presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of facts to the contrary. *See id.* at 1349; 35 U.S.C. § 282.

"Obviousness is a question of law based on factual underpinnings. . . . When the parties dispute the

underlying facts, the issue of obviousness typically is submitted to the jury." *Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc.*, 321 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Where—as here—the jury issued a general verdict on the ultimate legal question of obviousness, "the law presumes the existence of findings necessary to support the verdict the jury reached. The particular findings the jury must make before it can reach a verdict are controlled by the court's instructions." *Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp.*, 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984); *see also ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.*, 159 F.3d 534, 544–46 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co.*, 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "The general verdict thus includes the jury's legal conclusion and a set of implied fact findings, the latter being those necessary to support the legal conclusion encompassed in the verdict." *Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co.*, 727 F.2d 1506, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

A motion for judgment as a matter of law in a patent case is reviewed "under the law of the regional circuit where the appeal from the district court would normally lie." *See Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc.*, 324 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As Master Lock requests judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the jury finding of nonobviousness, I must deny the motion "unless the jury's verdict is unsupported by substantial evidence or premised on incorrect legal standards." *See McGinley*, 262 F.3d at 1350 (applying Tenth Circuit law). I must assess the evidence and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to Wyers as the verdict winner. *See id.* I will grant Master

Lock's motion only if "a reasonable jury would have no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to rule in Wyers's favor. *See Strickland v. United Parcel Service, Inc.*, 555 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009).

Patent claims are invalid as obvious when "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made by a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007); 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). A patent "composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art." *KSR Int'l*, 127 S. Ct. at 1740–41. This is particularly the case when combining known elements together yields "unexpected and fruitful" results. *Id.* at 1740. When a patent, however, "'simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform' and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious." *Id.* at 1739–40 (quoting *Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).

The Supreme Court in *KSR International* rejected the Federal Circuit's previous teaching-suggestion-motivation test in favor of "an expansive and flexible approach," holding: "In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is the objective reach of the

claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103." *Id.* at 1739, 1741–42. Therefore, a court should look at the "interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue." *Id.* at 1740–41.

II. ANALYSIS

A. '115 and '426 Patents

As the '115 and '426 patents cover essentially the same invention, I examine the claims of these two patents together. It is important to note that the subject matter of the invention described in the disputed claims at issue in these patents is not a lock, nor even a locking device, but is instead a sleeve that covers the shank portion of a lock for purposes of adjusting the shank's operative thickness such that the shank's diameter is the same as the diameter of the aperture of the locked-together objects. Although the specification notes that "any number of different kinds of lock configurations and types may be used with the present invention," the invention is claimed for use with locks that have a stop portion on one end and a locking portion on the opposite end, the lock portion and stop portion being separated by a shank. The invention was specifically designed to secure a drawbar to a trailer hitch receiver and is

described and depicted as a hitch pin lock throughout the specifications of both patents, as well as in Claim 15 of the '115 patent. The relevant question, therefore, is whether Master Lock presented clear and convincing evidence that the use of a sleeve to adjust the operative thickness of a shank would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art of manufacturing or designing such locks. The jury concluded Master Lock failed to make such a showing. I agree.

Implicit in the jury's verdict are seven factual findings: (1) a padlock is not a lock that has a stop portion on one end and a locking portion on the opposite end, the lock portion and stop portion being separated by a shank; (2) a padlock does not have a shank designed to closely fit a specific aperture; (3) a lock designed particularly for use as a hitch lock would require a shank with a load-bearing surface; (4) a person of ordinary skill in the art of manufacturing or designing hitch locks would not look to padlocks when attempting to improve the shank portion of a lock designed for close-fitted engagement with a specific-sized aperture; (5) the scope and content of the relevant prior art included only solid shanks with a single operative thickness; (6) a sleeve had not been used to adjust the operative thickness of a close-fitting shank prior to the claimed invention; and (7) the use of a sleeve to adjust the operative thickness of a close-fitting shank was a commercially-valuable invention that inspired widespread copying. Each of these factual findings was supported by substantial evidence in the form of testimony from either Mr. Wyers or Master Lock's expert, Mr. Costley. Additional

substantial evidentiary support came from Master Lock's own lock designers as expressed in Master Lock's Idea Disclosures 23 and 26, neither of which considered the 37D lock—a padlock with a sleeve covering a portion of the shank—or the Down patent—a 1976 patent that covered a sleeve used for adjusting the operative aperture of a trailer towing eye, but not altering the operative thickness of the hitch pin shank itself—relevant prior art.

Wyers also presented substantial evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness. Master Lock marketed the convertible sleeve with great success—achieving over $20 million in sales and penetrating the national mass-merchant market for trailer hitch pin locks. Prior to selling and marketing a convertible shank, Master Lock's presence in the trailer hitch pin market was limited mostly to second and third-tier retailers. Master Lock eventually lost the national retailers to Reese—another lock manufacturer that sells an allegedly-infringing sleeved hitch pin lock. While Wyers did not prove these results were solely dependent on the convertible sleeve, the results—when combined with Master Lock's marketing materials touting the benefits of the sleeve—are circumstantial evidence of commercial success due to the merits of the claimed invention. Moreover, Master Lock's acknowledgment that every other manufacturer of hitch pin locks began selling a sleeved lock after Wyers disclosed the concept to Wal-Mart provides circumstantial evidence of widespread copying of the claimed invention by others. As all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor

of Wyers as the verdict winner, this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to show secondary indicia of nonobviousness. *See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.*, 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Combined with the jury's other implicit findings regarding the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, these factual findings on secondary indicia of nonobviousness show a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have found the use of a sleeve to adjust the operative thickness of a close-fitting shank to be obvious.

The evidence presented by Master Lock was insufficient to show contrary factual findings by clear and convincing evidence. Master Lock's expert, Mr. Costley, testified he had only a personal acquaintance with the relevant field of hitch pin locks. Mr. Costley testified that his experience as a locksmith was not relevant to the issue of whether a sleeve could be used to adjust the operative thickness of a close-fitting or load-bearing shank. To the extent Mr. Costley opined that the use of a sleeve would have been obvious, therefore, the jury could accurately conclude—and implicitly did conclude—his opinion was not based on any expertise in the relevant field.

Mr. Costley also testified he had sold the 37D lock to customers looking for a coupler lock that would fit more than one aperture. On cross examination, however, Mr. Costley clarified that the 37D lock was not a hitch pin lock and could probably not be used for that purpose.

Mr. Costley also testified that the shank of the 37D lock—like other padlocks—was not a load-bearing surface in a manner similar to that of the shank of a hitch pin lock. The 37D lock was also not designed to fit a specific-sized aperture—rather, it was designed to fit "most coupler lock openings" with the sleeve removed and "13mm or larger aperture[s] with the sleeve on." Mr. Costley further testified that a lock designer would not look to the 37D lock for purposes of designing a sleeved shank for a hitch pin lock. Accordingly, the jury could accurately conclude—and implicitly did conclude—the sleeve of the 37D lock did not cover a load-bearing shank and was not employed for purposes of adjusting the shank's close-fitting operative thickness. The jury could—and implicitly did—reach a similar conclusion in regard to the Down patent. Accordingly, I agree with the jury that Master Lock failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that claims 15, 19, 21, and 24 of the '115 patent and claim 1 of the '426 patent are obvious.

B. '649 Patent

The subject matter of the invention described in the disputed claims at issue in the '649 patent is likewise not a lock, nor a locking device, but is instead an external flat flange seal designed to insulate the locking mechanism of a lock—which, like the lock described in the '115 and '426 patents, has a stop portion on one end and a locking portion on the opposite end, the lock portion and stop portion being separated by a shank—from the ingress of contaminants. Prior to Wyers's invention of the flat flange seal, such locks were sealed

with internal seals or seals attached to the shank portion of the lock. The relevant question is whether Master Lock presented clear and convincing evidence that the use of an external flat flange seal would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art of manufacturing or designing such locks. The jury concluded Master Lock failed to make such a showing. I agree.

Master Lock's evidence of prior art of the flat flange seal suffers from the same infirmities as its evidence regarding the sleeve—namely, Master Lock relied on seals used in padlocks. The jury's verdict indicates it did not find these padlock seals to be relevant prior art. This finding was supported by substantial evidence in the form of testimony from either Mr. Wyers or Master Lock's experts, Mr. Costley and Mr. Irgens. Additional substantial evidentiary support comes from Master Lock's own lock designers as expressed in Master Lock's Idea Disclosures that indicated Master Lock did not consider existing padlock seals to be relevant prior art. Moreover—to the extent the prior art did disclose an external seal on Master Lock's 6121 lock—the jury could, and implicitly did, conclude based upon the evidence presented that Wyers's seal contained an additional improvement in that it was flat in nature.

Wyers also presented secondary indicia of nonobviousness—as noted above in relation to the '115 and '426 patents—that the jury implicitly found to be sufficient. Combined with the jury's other implicit findings regarding the scope and content of the prior

art, the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, these factual findings on secondary indicia of nonobviousness show a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have found the use of an external flat flange seal to be obvious. Accordingly, I agree with the jury that Master Lock failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that claims 1, 9, and 11 of the '649 patent are obvious.

III. CONCLUSION

Although the ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, such a determination must be based upon certain factual inquiries. An examination of the jury's implicit findings on these inquiries show the findings were supported by substantial evidence. I conclude, therefore, that Master Lock failed as a matter of law to show the disputed claims were obvious by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, Master Lock's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law that Asserted Claims of the Patents in Suit are Invalid [**Docket # 294**] is DENIED.

Dated: May 8 2009.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

APPENDIX G — RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, FEDERAL RULE & STATUTORY PROVISION

United States Constitution
Seventh Amendment

Trial by jury in civil cases.

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50

Rule 50. Judgment as a Matter of Law in a Jury Trial; Related Motion for a New Trial; Conditional Ruling

(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.

(1) *In General.* If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:

(A) resolve the issue against the party; and

(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

(2) *Motion.* A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.

(b) Renewing the Motion After Trial; Alternative Motion for a New Trial. If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

(c) Granting the Renewed Motion; Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial.

(1) *In General.* If the court grants a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, it must also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by determining whether a new trial should be granted if the judgment is later vacated or reversed. The court must state the grounds for conditionally granting or denying the motion for a new trial.

(2) *Effect of a Conditional Ruling.* Conditionally granting the motion for a new trial does not affect the judgment's finality; if the judgment is reversed, the new trial must proceed unless the appellate court orders otherwise. If the motion for a new trial is conditionally

denied, the appellee may assert error in that denial; if the judgment is reversed, the case must proceed as the appellate court orders.

(d) Time for a Losing Party's New-Trial Motion. Any motion for a new trial under Rule 59 by a party against whom judgment as a matter of law is rendered must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.

(e) Denying the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; Reversal on Appeal. If the court denies the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the prevailing party may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling it to a new trial should the appellate court conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, it may order a new trial, direct the trial court to determine whether a new trial should be granted, or direct the entry of judgment.

35 U.S.C.S. § 103

§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 USCS § 102], if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill

in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.

(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), and upon timely election by the applicant for patent to proceed under this subsection, a biotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of matter that is novel under section 102 [35 USCS § 102] and nonobvious under subsection (a) of this section shall be considered nonobvious if—

(A) claims to the process and the composition of matter are contained in either the same application for patent or in separate applications having the same effective filing date; and

(B) the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.

(2) A patent issued on a process under paragraph (1)—

(A) shall also contain the claims to the composition of matter used in or made by that process, or

(B) shall, if such composition of matter is claimed in another patent, be set to expire on the same date as such other patent, notwithstanding section 154 [35 USCS § 154].

(3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "biotechnological process" means—

(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism to—

(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence,

(ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence, or

(iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said organism;

(B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a monoclonal antibody; and

(C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(c)(1) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title [35 USCS § 102], shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.

(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter developed by another person and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person if—

(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made;

(B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and

(C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term "joint research agreement" means a written contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two or more persons or entities for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research work in the field of the claimed invention.